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CONCLUSION
In deciding whether or not a corporate veil should be pierced, it would
be well for the courts to pay heed to Ballantine's caveat:
The problems involved, however, are to be solved not by "disregarding" the
corporate personality, but by a study of the just and reasonable limitations
upon the exercise of the privilege of separate corporate capacity under particu-
lar circumstances in view of its proper use and functions. If the separate cor-
porate capacity is perverted to dishonest uses, as to evade obligations or statu-
tory restrictions, the courts will interpose to avoid the abuse.8 0
Mechanical application of a formula in determining whether or not the
corporate veil should be pierced is inherently dangerous. For there is no
general formula to fit all cases, such as "alter-ego" or instrumentality.
Each situation must be considered by the court on its merits.
As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in a case involving substantially the
same considerations:
The problem is still enveloped in the mists of metaphor. Metaphors in law
are to be narrowly watched, for starting as devices to liberate thought, they
end often by enslaving it. We say at times that the corporate entity will be
ignored when the parent corporation operates a business through a subsidiary
which is characterized as an "alias" or a "dummy." All this is well enough if
the picturesqueness of the epithets does not lead us to forget that the essential
term to be defined is the act of operation. . . . The logical consistency of a
juridicial conception will indeed be sacrificed at times, when the sacrifice is
essential to the end that some accepted public-policy may be defended or up-
held. This is so, for illustration, though agency in any proper sense is lacking,
where the attempted separation between parent and subsidiary will work a
fraud upon the law. . . . At such times unity is ascribed to parts which, at
least for many purposes, retain an independent life, for the reason that only
thus can we overcome a perversion of the privilege to do business in a cor-
porate form.8 '
It may thus be concluded that the use of the entity privilege of separate
capacities in Illinois is at all time subject to limitations of an equitable na-
ture to prevent the privilege from being exercised or asserted for illegal,
fraudulent, or unfair purposes by those claiming under it; and the courts
of law or equity will step in to prevent its abuse as the situation, and jus-
tice, may require.
80 Ballantine, Corporations § 122 (2d Ed., 1946).
31 Berkey v. Third Avenue Railway Co., 244 N.Y. 84, 155 N.E. 58, 61 (1926).
THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL ARTICLE: AN
ESCAPE FROM ANACHRONISM
Much has been written about the proposed judicial amendment to the
Illinois Constitution in regard to the election of judges, but only a paucity
of writing has been devoted to the ever-increasing need to change the
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mandatory appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court which is included
in the proposed amendment.
Presently, between eighty-four and ninety per cent of the cases argued
before the Supreme court are heard involuntarily, that is, as a matter of
right to the appellant.' As a direct consequence of this fact, the power of
the Supreme court to use its discretion in selecting cases for review is
vastly curtailed.
The proposed judicial amendment, if adopted, will remedy the present
situation, because it will only require the Supreme court to hear two classes
of cases on appeal-namely, capital cases and constitutional questions. As to
all other cases, the Supreme court will determine on its own, whether
leave to appeal will be granted.2 Therefore, if the present amendment is
adopted, the high court will obtain the flexibility that it is so patently
lacking.
EFFORTS TO AMEND
There has been discussion of the need for a new judicial article since
1905 and several efforts have been made to amend the article.3 In 1922, for
example, the constitutional convention included in its draft of a proposed
constitution a completely new judicial article. Although that constitu-
tion failed of adoption by the people, it is interesting to note that it failed
not because of any wide disagreement over the need for a revised judicial
article but because the only choice was to accept or reject the proposed
constitution in toto.
The current effort to amend the Judicial Article started in 1951. The
1951 General Assembly created an interim legislative commission to re-
port to the 1953 session. This commission, working in conjunction with a
joint committee appointed by the Illinois State Bar Association and the
1 Cedarquist, The Continuing Need for Judicial Reform in Illinois, 4 De Paul L. Rev.
153,154 (1955).
2 Proposed Judicial Article of the Constitution of the State of Illinois. The power to
review decisions of the circuit courts will be vested in an Appellate court and a Su-
preme court. Most appeals will be taken to the Appellate court, but in any case in-
volving a question arising under the Federal or State Constitution and any capital case
resulting in the imposition of a sentence upon the accused, appeal will be taken from
the circuit court directly to the Supreme court. The Supreme court will have exclusive
authority to permit direct appeals in other types of cases. In general, litigants will be
entitled to only one appeal. The Supreme court will have power, however, to review
decisions of the Appellate court, and when a constitutional question arises for the first
time in and as a result of the action of the Appellate court, appeal may be taken to the
Supreme court as a matter of right. The same will be true whenever the Appellate
court certifies that its decision involves a question of such importance that it ought
to be decided by the Supreme court. In all other cases decided by the Appellate court,
it will be up to the Supreme court to decide whether a second appeal should be allowed.
3 Cedarquist, Th-. Continuing Need for Judicial Reform in Illinois, 4 De Paul L. Rev.
153,165 (1955).
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Chicago Bar Association, produced a Judicial Article which was pro-
posed to the 1953 General Assembly. Although the proposal was defeated
on the floor of the House, it met with popular approval among the people
of Illinois. The joint committee was reappointed and submitted a new
draft of the proposal to the 1955 General Assembly. This proposal, too,
was defeated.
This year, again, a revised Judicial Article to supersede present Article
VI of the state constitution will be proposed and, if approved by the legis-
lature, will be submitted to the voters of the state at the general election
in November, 1958. If then adopted, it will become effective January 1,
1961.
The purpose of this comment is to underscore the dire need for that
portion of the Proposed Judicial Article dealing with the appellate juris-
diction of the Supreme court in cases where direct appeal lies as a matter
of right.
BASES FOR MANDATORY DIRECT APPEALS
The appellate as well as the original jurisdiction of the Supreme court
is defined by the Illinois Constitution.4 Original jurisdiction is conferred
in cases relating to the revenue, mandamus, and habeas corpus. Appellate
jurisdiction is given in all other cases.
The legislature has the power to enlarge, diminish or abolish the appel-
late jurisdiction of the Supreme court5 except that by the constitution,
litigants are guaranteed the right of ultimate appeal to the Supreme court
in all criminal cases and cases in which a franchise, freehold, or the valid-
ity of a statute is involved.6
It is not by express provision of the constitution but by an enactment
of the legislature that any appeal goes directly from the trial court to the
Supreme court. At present, the right of direct appeal has been given liti-
gants by the legislature in the following cases:
(1) Where a franchise, or freehold, or the validity of a statute, or a
construction of the constitution is involved, in all cases relating to revenue,
or in which the state is interested as a party or otherwise, and cases in
which the validity of a municipal ordinance or county zoning ordinance
or resolution is involved and in which the trial judge certifies that in his
opinion the public interest so requires.7
4 111. Const. Art. 6, § 2.
5 Young v. Stearns, 91 Ill. 221 (1878).
6 111. Const. Art. 6, § 11. In such cases appeals and writs of error must go to the
Supreme court. L.S. & M.S. Ry. Co. v. Richards, 152 Ill 59, 38 N.E. 773 (1894). In all
other cases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court is entirely dependent upon
statute. Northern Trust Co. v. Chicago Rys. Co., 318 111. 402, 149 N.E. 422 (1925).
7 111. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 110, § 75.
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(2) Numerous miscellaneous cases covered by specific statutory provi-
sions.s
Direct appeal in criminal cases is provided for in the Criminal Code and
includes all cases above the grade of misdemeanors.9
CASE LAW REQUIREMENTS FOR STANDING ON DIRECT APPEAL
It will be advantageous at this point to examine the case law require-
ments imposed by the Supreme court to give a litigant standing on direct
appeal in four representative types of cases. These cases comprise the
great bulk of those heard by the Supreme court on direct appeal, namely,
freehold, franchise, revenue, and criminal cases.
A. FREEHOLDS
When the framers of the Illinois Constitution provided for an appeal as
a matter of right whenever a freehold is involved, they neglected to define
a freehold. Perhaps it was believed that the term was self-explanatory or,
as is usually the case, it was decided to let the courts prescribe the stand-
ard. Whatever the reason may have been, the result is that the Supreme
court has been burdened with the problem of determining when a free-
hold is involved and, as a consequence, has set up certain arbitrary stand-
ards which, through judicial precedent, have become the law.
As respects the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme court, a freehold
is defined as an estate in real property of inheritance, or of life, or the
term by which it is held. 10 Having decided at an early date that such a
definition of a freehold was not specific enough to be used as a determi-
nant upon which the Supreme court should invoke its appellate jurisdiction,
a subsequent line of cases enunciated a set of rules that have been tena-
ciously adhered to in determining when a freehold is involved. The rules
are:
(1) The title to realty must be put in issue by the pleadings and also in
the questions to be determined upon review by the Supreme court."
(2) The freehold must be directly, and not incidentally, contingently
and collaterally involved.' 2
(3) The necessary result of the judgment must be that one party gains
or the other party loses a freehold estate. 13
8 Consult Fitzpatrick, The Reviewing Courts of Illinois, 1952 I11. L. Forum 1, 7, at
note 46 for a collection of such statutory provisions.
9 111. Rev. Star. (1955) c. 38, § 7804. 10 Gage v. Scales, 100 Ill. 218 (1881).
11 Liberty Nat. Bank v. McCreary, 8 Ill. 2d 250, 133 N.E. 2d 14 (1956); Leverich
v. Roy, 402 Ill. 71, 83 N.E .2d 335 (1949).
12 McCarthy v. McCarthy, 6 111. 2d 52, 126 N.E. 2d 633 (1955); Petru v. Petru, 2 111.
2d 148,116 N.E. 2d 878 (1954).
13 Nelson v. McCabe Development Co., 408 Ill. 263, 96 N.E. 2d 576 (1951); Peters v.
Peters, 405 111. 507,91 N.E. 2d 438 (1950).
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The preceding rules have the virtue of being definite, but notwith-
standing such standards, any attempt to justify the continuance of direct
appeal as a matter of right merely because a freehold is involved is un-
warranted. In the first place, when the constitution was adopted, Illinois
was substantially an agrarian state in which the common denominator of
economic activity was land, and hence the legal rights to land required a
determination by the Supreme court. Today, however, the economic
make-up of Illinois is such that a leasehold interest, for example, is as im-
portant as a freehold. The same can be said with regard to ownership of
securities. It follows, therefore, that the right to appeal a freehold ques-
tion to the exclusion of other commercial interests is anachronistic.
Secondly, the procedural law has been adversely affected by virtue of
the right to direct appeal. To illustrate this proposition: Where there is a
joinder of causes of action or merely a two-count complaint, if one of
the issues is reviewable on direct appeal to the Supreme court and the
other issue is reviewable on appeal to the Appellate court only, the proper
procedure in such instances requires that the trial court preserve the iden-
tity of each so that each will, on appeal, be taken to the court having juris-
diction thereof.14 Such a rule has only led to duplicity. Two reviewing
courts must hear the different aspects of one case. Printers' fees are dou-
bled. Manpower is wasted. It is true that the Civil Practice Act was in-
tended to expedite the business of the court.15 But by allowing joinder of
causes of action the Civil Practice Act has actually created an additional
problem with regard to direct appeal and thereby sacrificed the expedien-
cy intended.
One of the strongest arguments in favor of curtailing the right of direct
review is that mandatory review has had the effect of forcing the court to
unduly concern itself with writing negative opinions. 10 Even a cursory
glance at recent volumes of the Illinois Reports will reveal the dispropor-
tionate amount of time consumed in stating why the court has no jurisdic-
tion under a particular set of facts. 17 Such an absurdity becomes apparent
upon consideration of the fact that only ten to fifteen per cent of the
cases handled by the Supreme court are on leave to appeal, whereas seven-
ty-five to eighty-five per cent of the cases decided are mandatory.'" It
follows that since the function of a supreme court is to act as an overseer
14 Borman v. Oetzell, 382 IIl. 110,115,46 N.E. 2d 914,918 (1943).
15 Myers v. Myers, 341 Il1. App. 406,409 (1950).
16Liberty Nat. Bank v. McCreary, 8 Il. 2d 250, 133 N.E. 2d 14 (1956); Romain v.
Lambros, 7 II. 2d 206, 129 N.E. 2d 739 (1955),
17 Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 7 111. 2d 266, 130 N.E. 2d 169 (1955); Mc-
Carthy v. McCarthy, 6 IIl. 2d 52, 126 N.E. 2d 633 (1955).
1s A Study of the Illinois Supreme Court, 15 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 107, 170 (1947).
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and solve the problems in the unsettled areas of the law, 19 this task is con-
sistently being frustrated by the continuation of direct appeal.
B. FRANCHISES
The term "franchise" as employed in section seventy-five of the Civil
Practice Act authorizing direct appeals to the Supreme court refers to a
special privilege conferred upon an individual or a corporation by the
government, which does not belong to citizens generally, by common
right.20 The contemporary usage of franchise as herein expressed is mere-
ly a reiteration of the definition given by Blackstone, ". . . a royal privi-
lege or branch of the King's prerogative subsisting in the hands of the
subject, and being derived from the crown must arise from the King's
grant."'21
In Morgan v. Louisiana,22 the court aptly remarked that much confu-
sion of thought has arisen from attaching a vague and undefined meaning
to the term "franchise." Once again, as a result of a "vague and undefined
meaning," the Illinois high court proclaimed that certain standards must
be complied with in order to invoke its appellate jurisdiction.23
It appears that the criterion generally required in order for a franchise
to be involved is that the suit must be brought directly to determine right
or title to franchise, and appeal is not authorized if issues involve only the
construction, but not the existence, of the franchise.24 In other words,
there must be a question as to the validity or existence of a corporation
or franchise or right to exercise privileges of a franchise. 25 In conclusion,
one must assail the existence and not merely the construction of a fran-
chise, in order to warrant direct appeal. 26
C. REVENUE
In order to give the Supreme court jurisdiction of a direct appeal on the
ground that the revenue is involved, the revenue must be involved directly,
and not incidentally or remotely. The question of revenue can be at issue
only when some recognized authority of the state or some of its political
subdivisions authorized by law to assess or collect taxes are attempting to
19 Interview with Justice Walter Schaffer of the Illinois Supreme Court.
20 Trico School Dist. v. School Trustees, 6 111. 2d 323, 324, 129 N.E. 2d 158, 159 (1955);
Community School Dist. v. Trustees, 6 111. 2d 320, 322, 128 N.E. 2d 898, 900 (1955).
212 Blackstone's Com. 37 (1767).
22 3 Otto (U.S.) 217 (1876).
23 Board of Trade v. The People, 91111. 80 (1878).
24 Chicago Bar Ass'n. v. Kellogg, 401 Ill. 275, 281, 82 N.E. 2d 639, 643 (1948).
25 People v. Union Trust Bank, 406 Ill. 208, 210, 92 N.E. 2d 663, 665 (1950); People
v. Meyers, 276 Ill. 260, 261, 114 N.E. 584, 585 (1916).
20 Rostad v. Chicago Suburban Water & Light Co., 211 Ill. 248, 249, 71 N.E. 978, 979
(1904).
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proceed under the law and questions arise between them and those from
whom the taxes are demanded.27 In cases involving the revenue, the Su-
preme court limits its decision to the objections made.28
Among the recent cases where direct appeal was allowed on the ground
that they involved the revenue are: a taxpayer's appeal of a personal prop-
erty tax judgment,2 9 an appeal by a dairy from a decree restraining the
state revenue department and its directors from assessing a retailer's occu-
pation tax against it,a° and a suit brought by taxpayers to enjoin the Secre-
tary of State and the State Treasurer from transferring truck license fees
paid to them to a state road fund and for return of the fees. 3 '
On the other hand, direct appeal has been held not to lie where the con-
troversy is merely over the question of what municipality shall have the
money derived from the revenue and there is no question as to whether
the money is revenue or not.3 2
Early cases construed the word "revenue" to embrace all taxes and as-
sessments imposed by any public authority, that it was not confined to
State taxes or public revenue, but embraced all revenue, whether it may be
State, county or city taxes, and that it includes special assessments made
by a city for any public improvement. 3 That proposition is still consid-
ered good law today.3 4
Although none of the cases or other authorities examined stated the
specific justification for the right of direct appeal where revenue is in-
volved, it is submitted that the legislature in creating the provision deemed
it a necessity that the sovereign power remain financially sound. This, in
turn, seemed to require the practice of adjudicating all cases involving the
revenue forthwith.
D. CRIMINAL APPEALS
The Criminal Code provides that "[a]ppeals . . . in all criminal cases
... above the grade of misdemeanors shall be taken directly to the Su-
preme Court. '3 5
The provision is obviously too clear to create serious problems of judi-
cial interpretation or construction. A "felony" is an offense punishable by
2 7 People v. Smith, 413 Il1. 382, 109 N.E. 2d 196 (1952).
2
s People v. Cairo & T.R. Co., 319 Ill. 118, 149 N.E. 824 (1925).
29 People v. Jennings, 3 111. 2d 125, 119 N.E. 2d 781 (1954).
30 Bowman Dairy Co. v. Lyons, 2 111. 2d 625, 120 N.E. 2d 1 (1954).
31 Agricultural Transp. Ass'n v. Carpentier, 2 I11. 2d 19, 116 N.E. 2d 863 (1953).
32 People v. Holten, 259 111. 219, 102 N.E. 171 (1913).
33 People ex. rel. Johnson v. Springer, 106 Ill. 542 (1883); Potwin v. Johnson, 106 Ill.
532 (1883).
34 Lackey v. Pulaski Drainage Dist., 4 I11. 2d 72, 122 N.E. 2d 257 (1954).
85 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 38, § 780 .
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death or imprisonment in the penitentiary and every other offense is a
"misdemeanor." 36
The apparent justification for this provision is a desire, on the part of
the legislature, to provide for prompt and competent final adjudication
where one's rights to life and freedom are at stake.
CONCLUSION
The need for action is clear. The Supreme Court of Illinois must be re-
lieved of its burden of compulsory appeal cases. Only then can it begin to
function in a manner commensurate with its status as the highest tribunal
of one of the country's leading commercial states. Given more discretion
in the selection of cases it will review, the court will be free to take those
cases that involve significant issues of law and matters of great public in-
terest. It will be free to bypass cases involving settled propositions of law
which fit into classifications deemed worthy of privileged cdnsideration
by the framers of a constitution now largely outmoded by intervening
decades of economic, 'social and political change. The proposed Judicial
Article, if adopted, will afford the Supreme court a much-needed increase
of discretionary power.
36People v. O'Connor, 414 I11. 51, 110 N.E. 2d 209 (1953).
IMPEACHMENT BY PRIOR CONVICTION
PENDING APPEAL
That evidence of a prior criminal conviction is admissible to impeach a
witness would seem to be a well-settled proposition of law. Yet an aspect
of this proposition has arisen four times, all quite recently, in the federal
system, and the decisions have demonstrated a need to go further into the
matter. Specifically, the problem situation arises in this way: W, a witness,
is questioned by the opposition about a previous criminal conviction, in
an attempted impeachment. Objection is made, on the ground that the
conviction is being appealed. Query: has W been convicted within the
meaning of the proposition stated above?
Reference to the standard texts discloses no discussion of this problem
although it has arisen many times in various states. That the problem is
closely circumscribed and limited in its application must be admitted. Its
implications, however, could become of prime importance in any number
of ways.
To take but one example, suppose a situation in which a candidate for
public office has been convicted of a crime, which conviction carries with
it the penalty of forfeiture of civil rights. Suppose further that the con-
viction is being appealed at the time of the election. Query: has the con-
viction, i.e. the forfeiture of civil rights, taken place, or will it be held in
